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PLURALISM IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS· 
JOHN B. DAVIS 
Economics, Marquette University 
The Review of Social Economy was first published in 1942 as 
the annual Papers and Proceedings journal of the Catholic Econo-
mic Association founded in December 1941, with a charter mem-
bership of 140 drawn largely from Catholic colleges and universi-
ties in the United States. By the end of the decade the journal had 
become submissions-based, had added book reviews, and was 
published twice annually. Early papers focused on the application 
of Catholic social doctrine to economics, the role of social values 
in the economy and in economics, social justice, and contempor-
ary problems in social-institutional economic organization (such 
as labor relations and unions, employment, social security, credit 
policy and the Federal Reserve, and postwar reconstruction). 
Though initially the majority of journal's contributors were neoc-
lassical economists, solidarism, a theoretical orientation critical of 
neoclassical economics with origins in the work of Heinrich Pesch 
(1854-1926) and Goetz Briefs (1889-1974) in interwar Germany, 
came to represent the thinking of an increasing number of social 
economists after its revival by past editor William R. Waters. Both 
Pesch and Briefs rejected liberalism and laissez faire, and argued 
instead for the idea of a social market economy and the view that 
the. economic process is embedded in the larger living context of 
socIety. 
In 1970, the members of the Association elected to give up 
their strict identification with Catholic social thinking, and re-
named the organization the Association for Social Economics to 
reflect and strengthen the increasingly pluralistic character of its 
membership, and to encourage development of a broader range of 
"" The author is indebted to Mark Lutz, Edward O 'Boyle. and William Wa-
ters for comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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philosophical and intellectual resources devoted to explanation of 
th~ economy as a socIal economy and economics as social econo-
mICS. I~ the years thereafter the organization expanded to include 
InstltutIO~al~sts: Marxists: and huma?ists, who were receptive to 
the AssocIatIOn s emphasIs upon socIal values in economics, and 
who brought new arguments regarding the socially-embedded 
and val~,:,-Iaden character of the economy and economics to bear 
on tr~dmonal economic theory, alternative theory, public policy, 
the hISt?ry. of economics, an.d ~he method?logy of the subjectl . 
The ~bJ~ctlves of the ASSOCIatiOn for Social Economics, as set 
forth m Its new Constitution, are as follows: 
. 1 .. To foster research a~d p~blication centered On the reciprocal rela-
tJ~)fl~hlP be~een economIC sCience and broader questions of human 
dignIty, ethIcal values, and social philosophy, [and to] encourage the 
efforts of all schobrs who are dedIcated to exploring the ethical presup-
posItIons and Imphcanons of economic science. 
2. To conside~ t~e personal and social dimensions of economic 
p~oblems and to aSSIst ~n the formulation of economic policies consistent 
WIth a concern for e~hI~al values. and pluralistic community and the de-
mands of personal dIgnity (Revtew of Social Economy, 1970, p. 244). 
.~he Associ.ati.on for Social Economics is thus, by charter, an 
explICItly pl.urahstlc organization with a unity defined to accomo-
date very dIfferent. ~Yfe~ of approaches to economics, yet also so 
as to exclude POSitiVistIC approaches to economics. The nearl q~arter century of publication in the Review since 1970 charts tJ!e 
hlst~ry of this plu~alistic enterprise dedicated to explaining the 
relat~on of economics. to SOCIal values, and, as it has turned out, 
contmu~ly at odds With orthodox social science and neoclassical 
~conomlcs. Her .. I sketch a br!ef acco~nt of this history by focus-
mg upon the. dIlemmas assocIated WIth explaining the economy 
and eC?nOmICS . as fun~~n.'e?t~lIy social and permeated with 
n~rm~tlve v:llue m a posmvlStlC Intellectual environment in which 
SClentlSm reIgns. 
. I~ to.day's world dominated by liberal philosophy and indi-
vlduahst Ideology, social economists encounter a deeply rooted 
1: ~n excellen~ source fo~ understanding the early development of the 
ASSOClatlon for SOCIal EconomICS are the readings in Lutz (1990). 
T , 
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and unexamined conviction on the part of academics, students, 
and people generally that moral values have little significance in 
modem society. Neoclassical economics bears much responsibil-
ity for fostering this belief, since it denies its world view is value-
laden, narrows normative economics to innocuous Pareto effi-
ciency, and diminishes consideration of justice, need, and human 
dignity in economic life. Indeed, it can be argued that this 'margi-
nalization of ethics' flows directly from neoclassicism's character-
ization of individuals as mere collections of subjective 
preferences2 • Yet if the view of individuals held by most econom-
ists must be radically reconceptualized before social economists 
can elaborate persuasive, alternative views of normative value in 
the economic process, then the obstacle to progress is truly signi-
ficant, since there is surely even less willingness among neoclassic-
al economists to re-examine their theory of the individual than 
there is to question their treatment of normative value. Of course 
not all social economists see the matter in just quite this way, 
though most generally do agree that economics needs to be fun-
damentally transformed away from the liberal neoclassical world 
view that treats individuals atomistically. The task facing social 
economics, then, is a large and difficult one, and this consequently 
sets the terms for the key challenge facing social economists: 
where to start and how much to attempt arguing. Two schools of 
thinking and two strategies in this regard distinguish social eco-
nomists on this question. 
One school of social economists believes it is strategically im-
portant to demonstrate that the normative analysis of neoclassical 
economics regarding improvements in individual and social well-
being fails in important ways. For example, when neoclassical 
economists argue that divorce tends to be Pareto efficient, it may 
be replied that this depends upon ignoring the associated welfare 
losses for children in poverty. Or, when neoclassical economists 
emphasize the importance of consumer sovereignty and the satis-
2. I have argued that neoclassicism is responsible for the 'marginalization of 
ethics' in Davis (1987). and that the neoclassical theory of ethics is the logical 
positivist-emotivist view that ethical statements are mere expressions of feeling in 
Davis (1994). 
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faction of preferences, it may be replied that this depends upon 
ignoring situations in which the market creates preferences harm-
ful to individuals. For social economists who argue along these 
lines, neoclassical normative economics is seriously deficient in its 
ethical vision and as a public policy guide. Showing that this is so 
demonstrates not only that atomistic markets do not have the wel-
fare features claimed for them, but also that neoclassical analysis 
fails to capture the real experience of individuals. Most of the 
empirical research and a good share of the conceptual research 
published in the Review has this character. In the last several 
years, papers published on women and families, discrimination 
and labor market segmentation, growth and stagnation, internal 
conflicts within firms, and a variety of other topics have sought to 
show that neoclassical economic research misunderstands the 
normative implications of the functioning of the market economy. 
The assumption that thus lies behind this strategy is that persua-
sive critique of the social-ethical side of neoclassical economics 
will ultimately have the greatest impact on the future development 
of economics. Essentially, social economists of this orientation 
believe that a theory inattentive to society's full range of ethical 
commitments regarding fairness, basic need, and human rights 
cannot be successful in the long run. Their conviction that show-
ing this is of pre-eminent importance typically derives from a 
strong sense of personal moral responsibility regarding why one 
carries out research. 
A second group of social economists believes that the neoc-
lassicism's world view is so evidently defective that its chief prop-
ositions can be readily exhibited as false, and then replaced by 
reasonable, alternative ideas which would be foundational to a 
new economics persuasive and plausible to openminded indi-
viduals. Social economists of this orientation generally already 
possess strong heterodox theoretical commitments, including In-
stitutionalism, Marxism and radicalism, solidarism, cooperativism 
and communitarianism, Post-Keynesianism, humanism and Kan-
tianis",:, feminism, environmentalism, and behavioralism. Though 
they dIsagree among themselves over the nature of alternative 
theory, they tend to share the view that economics and social sci-
ence always presuppose a value-laden world view, and that the 
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neoclassical world view is in important respects not socially prog-
ressive, both because of the values it promotes and because of its 
positivistic self-image. They thus generally contest individualism 
and explanation solely in terms of self-interest motivation, the 
supposed commensurability of tastes, the instrumental character 
of rationality as opposed to a rationality of ends, work as neces-
sarily undesirable, and the idea of the person as purely a subjective 
being without a need for dignity and self-esteem. Essentially, the 
strategy this type of social economic research employs is to 
attempt to provide a better theory. The assumption that lies be-
hind the strategy is that solid critique followed by good alterna-
tive analysis is ultimately persuasive, if not to those already com-
mitted to neoclassicism, then to those who are in the process of 
forming their future theoretical attachments. And, the conviction 
that this strategy is worth pursuing derives from a confidence in 
alternative theoretical approaches, which are themselves rooted in 
carefully considered views about the nature of economic life and 
society. 
Each of these twO strategies thus has its respective rationale, 
but each, it should be added, has also been argued to have impor-
tant limitations. Against those intent upon demonstrating that 
neoclassical economic theory generates the wrong results about 
individual and social well-being, it is often argued that, without a 
fully developed alternative conception of the economic process, 
one can never convincingly explain how a broader normative vi-
sion of economics is possible. And against those who believe that 
creating socially progressive alternative economic analysis is the 
primary responsibility of social economists, it is often argued that 
better theory must begin by premising our salient moral intui-
tions. Of course, juxtaposing these two points in just this manner 
suggests that, rather than two strategies each with their own 
limitations, the situation is better described as one in which the 
two strategies complement one another with each focusing on a 
different part of an overall project. There is some truth to this 
view, and indeed it explains much of the unity of the Association 
for Social Economics. Yet at the same time it would be a mistake 
to minimize the range of disagreement between members of the 
Association and those who publish in the Review of Social Eco-
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nomy over the relative importance of different moral values and 
the relative importance of different alternative theoretical 
approaches. It is a disagreement, as noted above, over just where 
to start and how much to attempt arguing vis-a-vis an economics 
profession strongly attached to an unreflective scientism. It is a 
disagreement, perhaps more importantly, that constitutes the 
source of pluralism in the Association, and as such is a disagree-
ment that may either strengthen or weaken the organization. This 
naturally invites us to ask as we look toward the future about the 
prospects for the sort of pluralistic enterprise in which the Asso-
ciation and the Review are engaged. Is pluralism in social econo-
mic thinking likely to strengrhen or weaken the Association and 
the Review? Indeed, what generally is the impact of pluralism on 
organizations that necessarily change through time? 
All organizations of course undergo change in time as its 
members change - a process that is helpfully understood in terms 
of generational turnover. The Association for Social Economics 
seems to be somewhere between its third and fourth generations 
in membership, one effect of which is that the early history and 
purposes of the organization have become increasingly remote for 
current members. Clearly the passage of time alters the conditions 
under which we operate together with many of the issues we con-
front, and we must be realistic about how much of the spirit and 
thinking of the past can or even ought to be preserved in the con-
tinuing work of any organization. But I want to suggest that the 
issue of generational change facing the Association and other like 
pluralistic organizations raises special problems over and above 
the general one of organizational continuity and memory. Plural-
ism tends to have a positive connotation in contemporary discus-
sion. It suggests tolerance, open-mindedness, and a cosmopolitan 
view of ideas. But there is a darker side to pluralism associated 
with division, fragmentation, and loss of shared direction, and a 
more complete grasp of pluralism in organizations surely depends 
upon understanding how balance is maintained berween openness 
and coherence. Two problems in panicular have arisen for the 
Association and Review in this respect. 
The first problem concerns the recent historical development 
of the Association and the timing of generational change. Genera-
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tions, of course, are loosely and conventionally delimited, and it 
may often be as appropriate to say that the overlappingness of 
periods of activiry of individuals rules out speaking of generations 
at all. But this has not been the case in the Association which 
formed a cohesive generation of new members and contributors to 
the Review at the time the Association was reconstituted in 1970. 
While of course many individuals who had been involved in the 
old Catholic Economic Association played an important part in 
the transition, the fact that a new sort of intentionally pluralistic 
organization was then established gave special prominence and 
responsibiliry to a collection of younger individuals who were be-
ginning their prime working lives. These individuals embraced the 
challenge of creating a new type of organization, one whose unity 
was to grow out of very different theoretical and intellectual 
approaches. Their contributions to the Review in the years that 
followed gave the organization and the journal a particular c1ariry 
and cohesiveness. But most of these individuals have now moved 
beyond the active part of their working lives, and perhaps ironi-
cally, because they played such a large role in the Association and 
Review for so many years, a like space and opportunity - it seems 
- was precluded for later, younger individuals, many of whom 
surely were attracted to late 1970s and early 1980s radical political 
economy, Marxism, and Post-Keynesianism for which new 
forums and challenges were being established. 
The second problem of pluralism for the Association - and 
indeed almost all intellectual organizations that seek to establish 
themselves more strongly as societies - concerns the general 
change in the academic employment relations in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In the past, the threat of unemployment for an 
academic having once been hired seems hardly as great as it has 
become today. Today performance levels are more closely moni-
tored to determine merit for continuation in employment, where 
the simple fact that measurable outcomes exist in publication has 
meant that performance is generally evaluated according to 
volume and rate of publication. One important effect of this has 
been that, since teaching remains a requirement, the need to pub-
lish has raised work loads for academics, thus forcing them to 
eliminate other activities previously engaged in. Of these, profes-
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sional service both within the university and to crossuniversity 
organizations has been substantially reduced. Within the universi-
ty this has meant decline in interdisciplinary interaction, the ex-
change of ideas, and the collegiality of academia. Outside of the 
university this has meant decline of involvement in the affairs of 
professional organizations, and a tendency for such organizations 
to become mere subscription services and conference participation 
outlets . For the Association, as with other like professional orga-
nizations, this has meant less contact between members, less 
shared activity, and less thought and commitment regarding the 
difficult task of building and maintaining a pluralistic organiza-
tion. In contrast, more orthodox professional organiza.tions seem 
to have prospered in recent years, most likely because they origi-
nally operated as research promotion services for their members, 
who thus have maintained their affiliations as just another job re-
quirement. 
For the Association of Social Economics, these two problems 
have interacted in a challenging manner. Generational turnover 
has in good part removed the leadership that previously defended 
the strengths and promise of pluralism, while the increasing con-
finement of academics to their computers has created a pool of 
potential members less able to engage the objectives and purposes 
of the Association than in the past. Despite this, the Association 
and the Review seems to have found a way to survive as a pluralis-
tic organization, albeit one different in nature than in the past. 
First, as indicated above, the Association and journal have come 
to include an even larger collection of heterodox economists than 
was involved in the 1970 combination of Catholic solidarists, 
Marxists, Institutionalists, and humanists. In many cases new 
orientations represent offshoots of past heterodox traditions. In 
other instances new issues have defined new groups outside of the 
mainstream. Second, the Association and the journal are becom-
ing more international than was the case for the first four decades 
of their history as principally North American institutions. In 
some considerable degree, this has been a matter of the interna-
tionalization of academia in tenns of opportunities for interaction 
across countries (personal and electronic) and the emergence at 
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the end of the 1980s of both English as a universal language and a 
worldwide publication market. 
These two developments make for an interesting comment on 
the transfonnation of pluralism in the Association for Social Eco-
nomics and the Review of Social Economy. On the one hand, di-
versity has only increased, and this cannot but represent a chal-
lenge facing both the organization and the journal. On the other 
hand, that the cause of unity out of diversity, the cause of plural-
ism, seems to have become increasingly a welcome one in recent 
years gives good reason to think that the challenge of gre.ater di-
versity not only can be met, but perhaps represents for an mcreas-
ing number an especially valuable project in itself. The May 1994 
conference in Bergamo on pluralism in economics seems effective 
testimony on this latter score. At the conference, many partici-
pants commented with some frustration that issues clearly divid-
ing individuals were not easily joined and discussed. But the con-
ference did occur, and different positions were aIred for common 
consideration. I suggest that the conference functioned as a micro-
cosm for the exchange of ideas between contrasting points of 
view. In this it seems to have shared the experience of the Associa-
tion and the Review that pluralism requires a conscious defense if 
it is to succeed. Pluralism, in the Association for Social Economics 
and more generally, then, needs active support to survive. This is a 
lesson to be learned from both the conference and from the his-
tory of the Association for Social Economics. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
CLARK, CHARLES MICHAEL ANDRES, Economic Theory and Natural Phi-
losophy. The Search for the Natural Laws of the Economy, Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar, 1992, pp. X, 198. 
The merit of Clark's book is that it proposes a unitary thesis in 
explanation of why a large part of economic theory has turned away 
from historical and social interpretation to assume the structure of a for-
malized science. 
The book's essential argument is that in the development of econo-
mic theory, from Adam Smith to Arrow and Debreu, a "Natural Law 
Outlook" (NLO) has been uncritically retained. That is to say, a pre-
analytical assumption has been preserved, according to which the reg-
ularities and unifortnities of the physical world have an equivalent in the 
social and economic universe. The NLO, which was particularly wide-
spread in the second half of the eighteenth century, was based on the 
belief that the universe, in all its manifestations, was organized according 
to a "design" conceived by a benevolent God. This belief was streng-
thened by Adam Smith, in whose work the "Natural Law Outlook be-
comes part of preconceptions of economic theory" (p. 35). There were 
three decisive influences on Smith's thought: Newtonianism, Natural 
Theology, and the elaborations of the natural law philosophers. 
From these currents of thought derived belief in a "natural order" 
which could be described by laws which embraced both the physical and 
the moral and social universe one, since each were expressions of the 
same order. The "invisible hand)" as Macfie has pointed out, was the 
product of this view (specific to Natural Theology), because God pro-
vided individuals with inclinations to promote his purposes and, ulti-
mately, general welfare. In Smith, however, Clark discerns a dichotomy. 
Although on the one hand the NLO gave rise to a static theory (which 
culminated in his investigation of the regularities characterizing the 
"Natural Order"), on the other one finds a dynamic vision of society in 
which his enquiry stresses historical and institutional aspects. Hume, 
and especially Montesquieu, were the inspirers of the theoretical 
approach to "society as process". 
Clark's intention, however, is to show that in the history of econo-
mic ideas natural philosophy increasingly became the model for moral 
philosophy and, consequently, for economic thought. In Bentham first 
